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Abstract
Re-identification algorithms are used in data privacy to measure dis-
closure risk. They model the situation in which an adversary attacks a
published database by means of linking the information of this adversary
with the database.
In this paper we formalize this type of algorithm in terms of true
probabilities and compatible belief functions. The purpose of this work is
to leave aside as re-identification algorithms those algorithms that do not
satisfy a minimum requirement.
1 Introduction
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) and statistical disclosure control (SDC)
are two active areas of research that study how to avoid disclosure of sensitive
information when data is released to third parties for their analysis.
One of the existing approaches for ensuring privacy consists of manipulating
the datafile adding some noise or reducing the quality of the information. Several
data protection methods have been developed in this direction. Noise addition,
microaggregation, rank swapping and PRAM are some of the existing methods.
In general, these methods consists of transforming a data file X by means of a
masking method ρ into a new data file Y . That is, the masking method returns
Y := ρ(X).
Methods reduce the disclosure risk at the expenses of some information loss.
In other words, the results from an analysis of X will in general give different
results than an analysis of Y . With the aim of quantifying this loss, several
information loss measures have been defined in the literature.
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Nevertheless, although the function ρ inflicts a perturbation in the data
that causes some information to be lost, the modification of the data may be
insufficient for ensuring privacy. Due to this, disclosure risk measures have been
defined and studied in the literature.
Disclosure risk measures can be defined in terms of re-identification. This
corresponds to identity disclosure. Re-identification algorithms permit us to
model the situation in which an adversary wants to attack a published data set
using some information that he has available. The adversary tries to link his
information expressed as records in a datafile with the records in the published
data set. The more records he reidentifies, the larger the risk. Therefore, given
a particular file, the proportion of reidentified records is a measure of the risk.
The concept of re-identification is also the cornerstone of the theory of k-
anonymity. A dataset is k-anonymous if for each record in the dataset, there are
other k− 1 records that are equal to it. Nevertheless, as pointed out in [13], the
important question here is not whether the records have the same or different
values, but that the records are indistinguishable in the re-identification process
(when the adversary attacks the dataset). This idea permitted us in [14] to
define n-confusion as an alternative to k-anonymity which provides the same
level of anonymity without requiring records to have the same values.
Because of that, re-identification algorithms are fundamental in data privacy
and the literature presents several algorithms for re-identification [16, 18, 19].
The literature also discusses some models [5, 1] for re-identification that are
used to determine the parameters of the algorithms. Nevertheless, up to our
knowledge, there is no approach for how to formalize and determine correctness
of re-identification algorithms. That is, there is no discussion on what a proper
and correct re-identification algorithm is, and what kind of result a correct
re-identification algorithm should give.
In this paper we present a formalization of re-identification in terms of belief
functions and true probabilities.
The basic idea is that a good re-identification algorithm, given some infor-
mation, a probability distribution over a population. If we assume that this
re-identification algorithm behaves correctly, then it cannot return any proba-
bility distribution but must return a distribution that is compatible with the
true one. In addition, we would expect that the more information we have
available, the more the probability of the algorithm should resemble the true
one.
In this paper we model this situation in terms of belief functions [11] and
the transferable belief model [12]. Departing from a true probability, we define
two types of re-identification algorithms. First, we define a re-identification
algorithm as one that returns a belief function that is compatible [2] with the
true probability, and later as one that returns the pignistic transformation of a
belief function that is compatible with the true probability.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review some concepts
that are needed later in this work. In particular, we discuss belief functions and
re-identification algorithms. In Section 4, we introduce our model and discuss
some relevant results about it. The paper finishes with some conclusions.
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2 Preliminaries
This section is divided into three parts. In the first part we review some concepts
related to belief functions, a model for approximate reasoning. We will use belief
functions to construct a model for record linkage. In the second part we review
k-anonymity, one of the approaches in data masking.
2.1 Belief functions
Belief functions can be used to represent uncertainty with respect to probability
distributions. We will not go into the details of their justification. The descrip-
tion in this section focuses on the concepts we need in the rest of the paper. For
details and additional discussion see e.g. [2, 12, 17].
Definition 1. A set function Bel : 2X → [0, 1] is a belief function if and only
if it satisfies
(i) µ(∅) = 0, µ(X) = 1 (boundary conditions)
(ii) A ⊆ B implies µ(A) ≤ µ(B) (monotonicity)
(iii) For all A1, . . . , An ⊆ X,
Bel(A1 ∪ ... ∪ An) ≥
∑
j
Bel(Aj)−
∑
j<k
Bel(Aj ∩Ak) + ...+
(−1)n+1Bel(A1 ∩ ... ∩ An). (1)
Belief functions are closely related to basic probability assignments. There
is a basic probability assignment for each belief function, and a belief function
for each basic probability assignment.
Definition 2. A function m : 2X → [0, 1] is a basic probability assignment if
and only if
(i) m(∅) = 0
(ii)
∑
A⊆X m(A) = 1
There exist two names for this function in the literature: basic probability
assignment (e.g. in [11]) and basic belief assignment (e.g. in [12]). In the rest
of the paper we will say just assignment.
The following proposition establishes the relationship between assignments
and belief functions.
Proposition 3. Let Bel be a belief function defined on the reference set X,
then the function mµ defined below is a basic probability assignment m:
mµ(A) =
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A|−|B|Bel(B) for all A ⊆ X. (2)
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Let m be a basic probability assignment, then, the function Belm defined below
is a belief function
Belm(A) :=
∑
B⊆A
m(B) for all A ⊆ X. (3)
Belief functions generalize probabilities. In particular, when m(A) = 0 for
all A such that |A| > 1, then Bel is a probability. In this case, the assignment
m to the singletons is the probability distribution. That is, P ({x}) = m({x})
for all x ∈ X , and then P (A) = Bel(A) for all A ⊆ X .
As stated before, belief functions can represent uncertainty in probability
distributions. They permit to differentiate situations which standard proba-
bilities cannot. For example, total ignorance in a set X is modeled defining
m(X) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all A 6= X . In contrast, when we know that the
elements in X all have the same support we assign m(x) = 1/|X | for all x ∈ X .
Note that this is different from the case of standard probabilities where both
situations are represented by P (x) = 1/|X | for x ∈ X .
Given a belief function Bel defined from m, Dempster defined the pignistic
transformation as a function that finds a probability distribution from Bel. This
pignistic transformation is based on the transferable belief model by Smets [12]
that distinguishes between the credal and the pignistic level. The credal level
is where beliefs are taken into consideration and operated on, and the pignistic
level is where beliefs are used. Although we do not understand probabilities
and beliefs as subjective, as Smets does, both levels are appropriate for mod-
eling re-identification. An ideal re-identification algorithm will compute belief
functions in the credal level, with the minimal possible commitments in case
of uncertainty. Then, when decisions are to be made, we move to the pignistic
level and probabilities are made concrete.
Definition 4. Let Bel be a belief function, then we define the pignistic proba-
bility distribution derived from Bel, PBel, as:
PBel({x}) =
∑
{B∈2X :x∈B}
m(B)
|B|
2.2 Data protection methods
Formally, given a data set X , a masking method ρ constructs a data set Y :=
ρ(X). Data privacy studies masking methods that return datasets which can be
released to third parties in a way that avoids disclosure of sensitive information,
but preserves the value of the data as material for analysis.
One of the existing concepts for data privacy is k-anonymity. A dataset
satisfies k-anonymity when for each record there are k − 1 other records that
are indistinguishable in the dataset.
Several algorithms have been proposed in the literature to build a dataset
compliant with k-anonymity through generalization, suppression and clustering.
For example, if we have 6 records with values 18,16,19,22,24,24 for attribute V1,
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we can consider the intervals [15,19],[20,25] and then recode the original values
according to these intervals. Doing so, we will have three in the interval [15,19]
and three other in the interval [20,25]. This ensures k-anonymity for k = 3 if
only this sole attribute is discussed.
We will use genVi to denote a method that ensures k-anonymity for a single
attribute Vi using generalization for some appropriate value k.
3 Re-identification algorithms
Given a datasetX , a protection method ρ, and the protected dataset Y := ρ(X),
disclosure risk can be measured in terms of the number of records in Y that
can be correctly reidentified. Indeed, a common approach when constructing
re-identification algorithms is to optimize with respect to this criterion [1]. Nev-
ertheless, although formalizations of the expected outcome of these algorithms
exist (i.e., we expect a method to maximize the number of correct links), no for-
malization exists on what we mean when we say that a re-identification method
is correct. We would like a formalization that excludes re-identification methods
which perform incorrect re-identifications. In this paper, we discuss a formaliza-
tion based on belief functions and a true probability. We will base our discussion
on a previous definition of re-identification algorithms used to define n-confusion
in [13]. The definition is as follows.
Definition 5. [13] Let ρ be a method for anonymization of databases, X a
table with n records indexed by I in the space of tables D and Y := ρ(X) the
anonymization of X using ρ. Then a re-identification method is a function that,
given a collection of entries y in P(Y ) and some additional information from
a space of auxiliary informations A, returns the probability that y are entries
from the record with index i ∈ I,
r : P(Y )×A → [0, 1]n
(y, a) 7→ (P (y corresponds to record X [i]) : i ∈ I) .
Consider the objective probability distribution corresponding to the re-identification
problem. Then, we require from a re-identification method that it returns a prob-
ability distribution that is compatible with this probability, also when missing
some relevant information. Compatibility can be modeled in terms of compati-
bility of belief functions (see [2, 12]).
Section 4 discusses re-identification algorithms and the compatibility issue
mentioned above. Before, we review some of the approaches that can be found
in the literature on record linkage. Recall that we have defined record linkage
in terms of the probability that y, the protected record, are entries from the
record with index i ∈ I, and we denote this by r(y, a)[i].
As we will see, for some methods we can understand probabilities as following
a Bayesian objective approach, and for other methods as subjective probabilities.
In the latter case, we can understand the probabilities as votes.
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Some of the methods described below are not completely formalized in the
literature, so the formulation is ours.
• k-anonymity and re-identification. Re-identification methods applied
to k-anonymous databases return for each y a list of possible records J ⊂ I
that are possible matches of the given record.
On the basis of the principle of insufficient reason (or principle of indif-
ference) this can be modeled by means of a uniform distribution over the
records in J . That is, r(y, a)[i] = 1/|J | for all i ∈ J .
An alternative model, not previously considered in the literature up to our
knowledge, is to consider belief functions. This will be the subject of this
article, and Example 11 focuses on the use of belief functions for their use
in k-anonymity.
• Probabilistic record linkage. The mathematical model formalized by
Fellegi and Sunter in 1969 [5] is based on a probabilistic model that com-
putes the probability of a particular coincidence pattern γ conditioned
by the existence of a match: P (γ|Match). Probabilistic record linkage
returns the probability of a correct match given a particular coincidence
pattern (i.e, P (Match|γ)). The Bayes’ rule is used in this process. This
situation can be modeled by
r(y, a)[i] = P (Match|γ(y, xi)).
• Specific attacks to data protection methods. The approach to attack
rank swapping in [9] can be represented in terms of a list of candidates,
in the line of the re-identification methods for k-anonymity as described
above. Re-identification attacks for rank swapping p-buckets can be mod-
eled by means of probabilities.
• Distance-based record linkage. Some literature exists where re-identification
methods assign to each record in one file the most similar record (at a
minimum distance) in the other file. In this case, probabilities can be
defined from the distances, but such assignments should typically be only
interpreted as voting or indications for subjective probabilities. [3] is an
exception to this, where a real probability is estimated taking into account
the similarity between records.
4 A formalization of re-identification
In this section we analyse the concept of re-identification further. In Definition 5,
re-identification is a function that, given some partial information on Y and some
additional information, returns a probability distribution on the set of records.
We claim that this probability distribution should be compatible with the
true probability. Our motivation is to create a theoretical foundation for disclo-
sure risk evaluation. The formalization will leave aside those re-identification
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algorithms that do not satisfy some minimum requirements. In particular, we
will not approve algorithms that deliver incorrect results on purpose, and we
will force algorithms to perform as well as possible, according to the evidence
found in the data and any a priori knowledge. For the purpose of risk evaluation,
using the worst case scenario, this implies no loss of generality.
In this section, we introduce a formalization that relies on a true probability
of re-identification. This true probability corresponds to the case in which we
know everything about the whole anonymization process, and assuming this
information is used in the re-identification process. That is, the true probability
only includes the uncertainty that cannot be removed because e.g. randomness.
We would expect that the re-identification process leads to a probability that
is less informative than the true probability in case of uncertainty, e.g. on the
masking process or on the data available for re-identification. Examples of such
uncertainty could be that some variables are not included in the risk analysis,
or that part of the masking process is not disclosed and cannot be taken into
account in the risk analysis.
Nevertheless, uncertainty does not justify all probability distributions. Only
some of them are valid. As an extreme example, we cannot accept as a re-
identification method one that assigns r(y,A)[i] = 1 if and only if i = i0 for any
y ∈ Y . In order to represent less informative probabilities we use imprecise prob-
abilities and, more specifically, belief functions. As stated in Section 2.1, belief
functions can be used when there is uncertainty in the values of a probability
distribution. When no additional uncertainty is present in the re-identification
process, the corresponding belief function is equivalent to a probability distri-
bution.
We will pressume that an ideal re-identification method is the one that ex-
presses uncertainty by means of a belief function. The belief function computed
by this re-identification method should be compatible with the true probability.
Here we use the term compatible according to Chateauneuf [2], who defined it
for belief functions. Definition 1 in [2] defines two belief functions as compatible
when the joint information is non-empty. The definition which we will use here
is the same as Chateauneuf’s definition except for the fact that we will compare
a probabilty (the true one) and a belief function.
We will use P to denote the true probability of re-identification. We give its
formal definition below.
Definition 6. Let X be a dataset, ρ a data masking method, and Y := ρ(X).
Then, we define the true probability Pρ,X,Y (xi|yi) as the probability that the
protected record yi proceeds from the record xi given ρ, X, and Y .
Given a true probability and a belief function, we define their compatibility
as follows.
Definition 7. Given a probability P , we say that a belief function Bel is com-
patible with P if P ≥ Bel.
For the sake of illustration, let us consider the following example with partial
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information in the re-identification process. This will be a running example of
this paper.
Example 8. Let X be a dataset with different attributes V1, . . . , Vm. Consider
the masking method ρ where each attribute Vi is protected by means of a gen-
eralization method genVi which ensures k-anonymity for k = ki. That is, given
that X [Vi] represents the column of X with attribute Vi, we have that genVi is
applied to X [Vi] for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and Y is defined in terms of the results
of genVi putting their results side by side as follows
Y := ρ(X) = [genV1(X [V1])|| . . . ||genVm(X [Vm])] .
The true probability Pρ,X,Y for the re-identification of X and Y := ρ(X)
for a given record y ∈ Y assigns the same non-zero probability to all records
x in X such that y can proceed from x (taking into account the generaliza-
tion processes genVi), and assigns 0 to all other records. Formally, let the
record y be y = (y1, . . . , ym) and let us define the candidate set of y as the
records x ∈ X such that y can proceed from x (i.e., CandidateSet(y) = {x|y =
(genV1(x1), . . . , genVm(xm))}). Then, the true probability of x given y is defined
by:
Pρ,X,Y (x|y) =
{ 1
|CandidateSet(y)| if x ∈ CandidateSet(y)
0 if x /∈ CandidateSet(y)
Re-identification methods that are applied to subsets of Y consisting of only
some attributes will lead to probability distributions that may be different from
the true probability distribution. If this is the case, then they will be less
informative. Note that, when only a subset of attributes V ′ ⊆ {V1, . . . , Vm}
are considered, then the re-identification algorithm may select more candidates
than there are in the true candidate set.
In the next example we consider the re-identification of the ith register of Y
taking into account only partial knowledge consisting of some of the attributes.
Example 9. Let X, ρ, Y := ρ(X), y ∈ Y and genVi be defined as in Example 8.
Let Attrs(j) for j = 1, . . . , 2m represent all possible (non-empty) subsets of
attributes of V = {V1, . . . , Vm} indexed by j. Let yj ⊆ P(Y ) for j = 1, . . . , 2m
represent a record of the database Y restricted to Attrs(j). An example of an
indexation of attribute subset is Attrs(1) = {V1} and Attrs(3) = {V1, V2}.
Then, we expect a re-identification method applied to yj, and taking into
account how Y is generated from X using ρ, to deliver the following probability
distribution:
r(yj , a)[i] =
{ 1
|CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)|
if xi ∈ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)
0 if xi /∈ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)
where CandidateSetsA(yj) includes a record x ∈ X if y can proceed from x
when only the attributes in A are considered.
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It is easy to see that for any record y in Y , we have
CandidateSet(y) ⊆ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)
and therefore Pρ,X,Y (xi|y) ≥ r(y, a)[i] for all xi in X .
In this example the re-identification method assigns to all records in the
candidate set the same probability. This is the usual way to assign probabilities
under the principle of indifference. Nevertheless, in reality we only know that
the true match is one of the records in the candidate set and that we do not
have any preference on them. If we instead allow the re-identification to return
a belief function, then this situation can be properly expressed. We define now
the concept of re-identification method expressing uncertainty, a re-identification
method that is not required to assign probabilities to singletons.
Definition 10. Let ρ be a method for anonymization of databases, X a ta-
ble with n records indexed by I in the space of tables D and Y := ρ(X) the
anonymization of X using ρ. Let Pρ,X,Y (x|yi) be the true probability of ρ, X
and Y . Then a re-identification method expressing uncertainty is a function
that, given a collection of entries y in P(Y ) and some additional information
from a space of auxiliary informations A, returns the belief function compatible
with the true probability Pρ,X,Y (xi|y) that y are entries from the record with
index i ∈ I
r∗ : P(Y )×A → [0, 1]2
|X|
(y, a) 7→ (m(y proceeds from a record in B) : B ⊆ X) .
As for any belief function, in this definition we expect
(1) m(X) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all A 6= X when there is no evidence on which
are the original records corresponding to the protected record y, and
(2) an increment of the belief function for B ⊆ X when the evidence increases
for records in B.
In addition, the same belief functions will apply to different protected records
whenever these have the same values. Formally, we have that Bel(y, a) =
Bel(y′, a) if y = y′ holds.
The following example illustrates the use of a re-identification method ex-
pressing uncertainty.
Example 11. Let X, ρ, Y := ρ(X), y ∈ Y , yj, genVi , CandidateSet and
CandidateSetA be defined as in Examples 8 and 9. Then, the belief function
r∗(yj , a) that better represents the uncertainty is defined by the following assign-
ment:
m(A) =
{
1 if A = CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)
0 otherwise
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Therefore, for all B ⊆ X,
r∗(yj , a)(B) =
∑
A⊆B
m(A)
It is easy to see that r∗(yj , a)(B) = 1 if and only if CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y) ⊆
B.
For the belief functions in this example we can prove the following.
Proposition 12. The belief functions r∗(yj , a) defined in Example 11 are com-
patible with the true probability in Example 8.
Proof. For simplicity, let us use the notation Bel(B) = r∗(yj , a)(B). We need
to prove that P (C) ≥ Bel(C) for all C ⊆ X . Since Bel(B) ∈ {0, 1}, we only
need to check two cases.
• When Bel(C) = 0, it is clear that P (C) ≥ Bel(C) for all C.
• When Bel(C) = 1, then C ⊇ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y) ⊇ CandidateSet(y).
Therefore, P (C) ≥ P (CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)) ≥ P (CandidateSet(y)) =
1. So, P (C) = Bel(C).
In the case of Bel(C) = 1 we use the condition discussed above that
CandidateSet(y) ⊆ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y).
This proves the proposition.
In contrast, if the re-identification method assigns m(B) = 1 to a set B that
misses one record xi of the candidate set of y, then the inferred belief function is
not compatible with the true probability. This is formalized in the next lemma.
Lemma 13. Let x0 be a record of the candidate set, let B be an arbitrary subset
of X, and let
C0 = (B ∪ CandidateSet(y)) \ {x0}.
Let a re-identification method assign m(C0) = 1 and m(C) = 0 for all C ⊆ X
such that C 6= C0. The belief function induced from m is not compatible with
the true probability.
Proof. It is easy to see that the belief function satisfies Bel(C0) = 1. Never-
theless, since C0 does not include x0, we have that the true probabiliy for C0
is
P (C0) = 1−
1
|CandidateSet(y)|
.
Therefore, as P (C0) < Bel(C0), the belief function is not compatible with the
probability.
It is important to note that this result removes from the set of valid re-
identification methods expressing uncertainty those that miss the correct records
from the candidate set.
10
4.1 Pignistic transformation and re-identification meth-
ods
In the previous section we defined a general re-identification method that re-
turns a belief function, and this belief function is required to be compatible
with the true probability. Nevertheless, as re-identification methods in real ap-
plications return probabilities, we reconsider our definition of re-identification
algorithms so that they also return probability distributions. Nevertheless, these
probability distributions are required to proceed from the belief function.
In particular, the probability is constructed from the belief function following
the principle of insufficient reason (or principle of indifference). That is, the
assignment m to a set is distributed to the singletons of this set according to
a uniform distribution. We say that a probability constructed in this way is
compatible with the original distribution.
This construction precisely corresponds to the pignistic transformation and
follows the transferable belief model by Smets. Details of a characterization of
the transformation is given in [12]. This pignistic transformation was defined in
Definition 4.
Definition 14. Given two probabilities P and P ′, we say that P ′ is compatible
with P if there exists a belief function Bel compatible with P such that P ′ is the
pignistic probability distribution derived from Bel (i.e., P ′ = PBel).
We now present the pignistic probabilities for the running example.
Example 15. The pignistic probabilities for the belief functions of Example 11
for yj are as follows:
P (yj , a)[i] =
{ 1
|CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)|
if xi ∈ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)
0 otherwise.
The probabilities defined in this example satisfy the following inequalities:
• If xi ∈ CandidateSet(y), then xi ∈ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y) for all j.
Then, we have
P (yj , a)[i] =
1
|CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)|
≤ Pρ,X,Y (xi|y) =
1
|CandidateSet(y)|
• If xi /∈ CandidateSet(y) and xi ∈ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y), then we have
P (yj , a)[i] =
1
|CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y)|
≥ Pρ,X,Y (xi|y) = 0
• If xi /∈ CandidateSet(y) and xi /∈ CandidateSetAttrs(j)(y), then we have
P (yj, a)[i] = Pρ,X,Y (xi|y) = 0
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Therefore, in general, for a given xi the pignistic probability can be either
larger or smaller than the true probability. However, it cannot assign a zero
probability to an xi in the candidate set.
In fact, the next proposition proves that the support of the probability of
the re-identification method should contain the support of the true probability.
Proposition 16. Let P be a true probability, let Bel be a belief function com-
patible with P , let P ′ be the pignistic probability derived from Bel. Let BP be
the support of P (i.e., BP = {x|P (x) 6= 0}), and let BP ′ be the support of P ′.
Then, BP ⊆ BP ′ .
Proof. Let x0 be an arbitrary element of the support of P , so P (x0) 6= 0. Let
α = 1 − P (x0). Then, taking into account that Bel is compatible with P , we
have
1 > α = 1− P (x0) = P (X \ {x0}) ≥ Bel(X \ {x0}) =
∑
C⊆X\{x0}
m(C).
So,
1−
∑
C⊆X\{x0}
m(C) > 0.
As
∑
C⊆X m(C) = 1, we have∑
C⊆X:x0∈C
m(C) = 1−
∑
C⊆X\{x0}
m(C) > 0.
So, there exists at least one C such that x0 ∈ C and m(C) 6= 0.
Then, by definition of the pignistic transformation, for all x ∈ B, P ′(x) 6= 0.
Therefore, x0 is an element of the support of P
′. As x0 is an arbitrary element
of the support of P , the statement is proven.
Now we will discuss two properties of the probability of re-identification that
concern the case in which the probability is one for a single record. That is, we
have that the true probability is a Dirac delta distribution at a single record x0.
This distribution is denoted by δ(x0) and its value is 1 if and only if x = x0. Note
that this case is possible in Example 8 when the intersection of the candidate
sets of two (or more variables) is a singleton. Formally, |CandidateSetVi(y) ∩
CandidateSetVj(y)| = 1. A similar situation was exploited in [9] to attack rank
swapping.
Lemma 17. Let P be a Dirac delta distribution at x0. Let Bel be a belief
function compatible with P . Then, m(A) = 0 if any only if A ∩ {x0} = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that A ∩ {x0} = ∅, then we have P (A) = 0.
As P (A) ≥ Bel(A), then we have Bel(A) = 0.
Therefore, as Bel(A) = 0 =
∑
B⊂Am(B) and m(B) ≥ 0 for all B ⊆ A, we
have m(A) = 0.
The fact thatm(A) = 0 implies A∩{x0} = 0 is a corollary of Proposition 16.
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Proposition 18. Let P (i) = r(y, a) be a Dirac delta distribution at i0. Let
P ′ be a probability compatible with P . Then, if P ′ has its maximum in i′ (i.e.
i′ = argmaxP ′(i)), then i′ = i0.
Proof. Suppose that P (i) = 0 for all i 6= i0, and P (i0) = 1. Lemma 17 implies
that m(A) = 0 for all A∩ {i0} = ∅. Let A = {A|m(A) 6= ∅}, then for any belief
function compatible with P ,
PBel({i0}) =
∑
A:i0∈A
m(A)
|A|
=
∑
A∈A
m(A)
|A|
≥
∑
A∈A:A∩{i1}={i1}
m(A)
|A|
= PBel({i1})
for all i1 6= i0.
If P ′ is compatible with P , then there exists a belief function Bel compatible
with P such that P ′ = PBel.
Note that this proposition is valid only when the true probability is a Dirac
delta distribution. However this should not usually be the case if the data
protection algorithm is effective. For example, in Example 8 there may be y
with |CandidateSet(y)| = 1, but for other |CandidateSet(y)| = k > 1, so that
the probability is 1/k < 1. In general, we might even have that the record with
a maximal probability is not one of the records in the candidate set. The next
proposition establishes this fact.
Proposition 19. Let X be a reference set with |X | ≥ 3, let A ⊆ X be a set
of k ≥ 2 records with a true probability for record y equal to 1/k. Then it is
possible to have a probability compatible with the true probability such that the
record with maximum probability is none of the ones in A.
Proof. Let P represent the true probability. Then P (x) = 1/k for all x ∈ A.
Consider a record x0 not in A. Therefore P (x0) = 0. Then, define a belief
function Bel in terms of m as follows:
m(C) =
{
1
k if C = {x0, x} for any x ∈ A
0 otherwise
First we prove that this belief function is compatible with P . To do so, we
need to prove that P (B) ≥ Bel(B) for all B ⊂ X . To do so, we consider two
cases for the sets B ⊆ X according to the membership of x0 to B. Note that in
both cases we have P (B) = |B ∩ A| · (1/k).
• Case x0 ∈ B: As Bel(B) = |B ∩A| · (1/k), we have that P (B) = Bel(B).
• Case x0 /∈ B: As Bel(B) = 0, we have that P (B) ≥ Bel(B) = 0.
Now we consider the pignistic probability from Bel. It is easy to prove that
PBel(x) =


1/k
2 if x ∈ A
1/2 if x = x0
0 otherwise
Therefore, we have that x0 is the record with maximum pignistic probability
when precisely x0 is not in A.
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This proposition implies the following corollary.
Corollary 20. Given a compatible probability P ′ of a true probability P , the
record with maximal value in P ′ can be different from the record with maximal
value in P .
The next example illustrates a masking method that leads to a belief function
and a probability distribution as the one in the above Proposition 19.
Example 21. Let ρ be a masking method defined as follows for records x in N3.
1. Let α be a random number in {0, 1} according to a uniform distribution.
2. Let β be a random number in {1, 2, 3} according to a uniform distribution.
3. Let y := x+ αeβ where ei is the unit vector in N
3.
Given A = {x0 = (000), x1 = (100), x2 = (010), x3 = (001)} and X ⊇ A, we
can model the re-identification of y = (000) by means of the belief function in
Proposition 19. Therefore, when we guess by selecting the most probable record
using the pignistic transformation, we select x0. However, if α is known to be
zero, x0 is impossible.
The results given in this section describe the behaviour of our formalization
for re-identification. At the same time, they give constraints on what we consider
to be a proper re-identification algorithm, and, thus, they define the minimal
requirements for these algorithms.
4.2 Evidence and uncertainty measures
When new information is given to the re-identification algorithm, the belief
function is updated according to this new evidence. The most particular case is
when we consider that mass is transferred to a set C1 from a larger set C2. That
is, we increment the mass of C1 while reducing the one of C2 and not modifying
the rest of sets.
The literature presents several definitions of uncertainty measures to evaluate
either belief functions or probability distributions. Klir and Wierman [7] give
an account and a classification of some of these measures.
In this section, we first show with examples that the entropy of the pignistic
probability is not monotonic. We give these examples because entropy is often
interpreted as a measure of information and, as such, one might think that in
our case C1 is more informative than C2. As the examples show, in some cases
the entropy is monotonic to this type of transformations, but in other cases it
is not.
Later, we prove that the measure of nonspecificity is monotonic with respect
to the changes caused by transferring evidence from C2 to C1. This measure was
defined by Dubois and Prade [4] as a generalization of the measure by Higashi
and Klir [6]. A characterization of this measure was given by Ramer in [10] (see
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Klir and Wierman [7] for details). We consider that this measure represents
better the quantity of information in a belief function.
The section finishes with a discussion on the uncertainty measures for re-
identification.
Definition 22. The entropy of a belief function Bel is defined as the entropy
of the pignistic probability distribution derived from Bel. That is,
Entropy(Bel) =
∑
x∈X
PBel(x) logPBel(x) (4)
Let us now consider two examples of the entropy of belief functions.
Example 23. Let X = {x1, . . . , x8} and let Bel be the belief function defined
by
• m({x1, . . . , x5}) = 0.07692307 · 5
• m({x1, . . . , x8}) = 0.07692307 · 8
The pignistic probability PBel corresponds to:
• PBel(x1) = PBel(x2) = PBel(x3) = PBel(x4) = PBel(x5) = 0.15384614
• PBel(x6) = PBel(x7) = PBel(x8) = 0.07692307
Define Bel′ by transferring mass from C2 = {x1, . . . , x8} to C1 = {x1, x2}.
We have that, C1 ⊆ C2, and, therefore, C1 is more specific than C2. Let be the
transferred mass be equal to ∆ = 0.038461544 · 8. Therefore, we have that the
new belief function is defined by:
• m′({x1, x2}) = m({x1, x2}) + ∆ = m({x1, x2}) + 0.038461544 · 4 · 2
• m′({x1, . . . , x5}) = m({x1, . . . , x5}) = 0.07692307 · 5
• m′({x1, . . . , x8}) = 0.07692307 · 8−∆= 0.07692307 · 8− 0.038461544 · 8 =
0.03846153 · 8
The pignistic probability PBel′ corresponds to:
• PBel′ (x1) = PBel′ (x2) = 0.038461544 · 4 = 0.15384617
• PBel′ (x3) = PBel′ (x4) = PBel′(x5) = 0.07692307+0.03846153 = 0.1153846
• PBel′ (x6) = PBel′ (x7) = PBel′(x8) = 0.03846153
The entropy of PBel is 2.0317593 and the entropy of PBel′ is 1.8300099.
So, in this case transferring mass/evidence from a larger set to a smaller one
reduces entropy.
Example 24. Let X = {x1, . . . , x10}. Let Bel be the belief function defined by:
• m({x1, . . . , x10}) = 0.08333332 · 10
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• m({x1, x2}) = 0.08333332 · 2
The pignistic probability PBel corresponds to:
• PBel(x1) = PBel(x2) = 0.16666664
• PBel(x3) = PBel(x4) = PBel(x5)
= PBel(x6) = PBel(x7) = PBel(x8)
= PBel(x9) = PBel(x10) = 0.08333332
Define Bel′ by transferring mass equivalent to ∆ = 0.08333332 · 10 from
C2 = {x1, . . . , x10} to C1 = {x3, . . . , x10}. Then, the new belief function Bel′ is
defined by:
• m′({x1, . . . , x10}) = m({x1, . . . , x10})−∆ = 0
• m′({x3, . . . , x10}) = m({x3, . . . , x10}) + ∆ = 0 + 0.08333332 · 10
= 0.10416665 · 8
• m′({x1, x2}) = m({x1, x2}) = 0.08333332 · 2
Therefore, its pignistic probability PBel′ corresponds to:
• PBel(x1) = PBel(x2) = 0.08333332
• PBel(x3) = PBel(x4) = PBel(x5)
= PBel(x6) = PBel(x7) = PBel(x8)
= PBel(x9) = PBel(x10) = 0.10416665
Here, we have that the entropy of PBel is 2.2538579 while the one of PBel′
is 2.2989538. So, we have that the entropy of the pignistic distribution of the
belief function with more information PBel′ is larger than the entropy of the
other distribution PBel.
The behaviour of the entropy in these two examples can be explained from
the fact that the entropy is a Schur-concave function (see e.g. [8] for details).
In the first example, PBel majorizes PBel′ , and therefore entropy(PBel) ≥
entropy(PBel′ ). In the second example, is PBel′ who majorizes PBel and thus
entropy(PBel′ ) ≥ entropy(PBel).
We prove now that the measure of nonspecificity is monotonic with respect
to a mass transfer. First we introduce this measure.
Definition 25. [4] The measure of non-specificity N for a belief function Bel
is defined by
N(Bel) =
∑
A⊆X
m(A) log |A| (5)
For this measure, the following holds.
Proposition 26. Let C1, C2 be two subsets of X such that C1 ⊆ C2, let Bel be
a belief function defined by m and Bel′ a belief function defined by the following
m′
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• m′(C1) = m(C1) + ∆
• m′(C2) = m(C2)−∆
• m′(A) = m(A) for all A 6= C1 and A 6= C2
where ∆ is a value such that m(A) ∈ [0, 1] for all A ⊆ X.
Then, the nonspecificity of Bel is larger than the nonspecificity of Bel′, that
is
N(Bel) ≥ N(Bel′).
Proof. To prove this proposition, let us consider the nonspecificity of Bel and
put it in terms of the nonspecificity of Bel′:
N(Bel′) =
∑
A⊆X m
′(A) log |A|
=
∑
A⊆X,A 6=C1
m′(A) log |A|
+m′(C1) log |C1|
+m′(C2) log |C2|
=
∑
A⊆X,A 6=C1
m(A) log |A|
+(m(C1) + ∆) log |C1|
+(m(C2)−∆) log |C2|
=
∑
A⊆X,A 6=C1
m(A) log |A|
+m(C1) log |C1|
+(m(C2) log |C2|
+∆ log |C1|
−∆ log |C2|
= N(Bel) + ∆(log |C1| − log |C2|)
(6)
As |C1| < |C2| we have that log |C1| − log |C2| < 0, so that N(Bel) ≥ N(Bel′).
We have seen in this section that nonspecificity is useful to measure the in-
formation in a belief function, and that entropy is not. The failure of entropy in
this context might seem to be in contradiction with the fact that entropy typi-
cally is understood as a measure of information. Nevertheless, the classification
of uncertainty measures given in Klir and Wierman [7] sheds some light over
this issue. Entropy is classified as a measure of conflict. In this sense, the belief
function m′ in Example 24 presents a larger conflict for a decision than when
mass is transferred from C2 to C1. This is so because the probabilities are much
more similar in m′ that in m although we have more information in m′ than in
m. In contrast, Klir and Wierman classify non-specificity as a measure of im-
precision, which is said to be connected with sizes (cardinalities) of relevant sets
of alternatives (see p. 43 in [7]) which is precisely the case here. Proposition 26
clearly shows that any transference of mass from a set to a more concrete one
will always increase the measure. Indeed, we have that N(Bel) = 0 when Bel
is a probability distribution.
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4.3 Conditioning
When additional information is given to the re-identification algorithm, the
belief function is expected to change accordingly. In general, we can pressume
that this information can also be represented in terms of a belief function. Note
that conditioning in probability theory can be expressed by a belief function.
For example, conditioning by the presence of an element in a set B which in
probability theory results into the probability P (A|B), will be expressed by the
conditioning with respect to the belief function generated from mB(B) = 1 and
mB(A) = 0 for all A 6= B. Naturally, the belief function used in the conditioning
should also be compatible with the true probability.
Therefore, given two belief functions compatible with the true probability,
the conditioning should lead to another belief function, also compatible with
the true probability.
Definition 27. Given two belief functions Bel1 and Bel2 compatible with a true
probabilty P , an acceptable combination function C is a combination function
that returns a new belief function Bel that is compatible with P and such that
N(Bel) ≤ min(N(Bel1), N(Bel2)).
Any combination function that satisfies this property will be suitable for
conditioning. See e.g. [17, 15] for functions satisfying this property.
Definition 28. Given r belief functions Bel1, . . . , Belr compatible with a true
probability P , we define their combination C′ as the extension of the acceptable
combination function C as follows:
C
′(Bel1, . . . , Belr) =
{
C(C′(Bel1, . . . , Belr−1), Beli) if i > 2
C(Bel1, Bel2) if i = 2
(7)
Then, when different items it1, . . . , itk of additional information are consid-
ered, all of them expressed by means of belief functions Belit1 , . . . , Belitk , which
are compatible with the true probability, and we combine them, the result will
converge to be the true probability, and the nonspecificity is reduced. When
the true probability is achieved, we have that the nonspecificity is zero.
Proposition 29. Let it1, . . . , itk be a set of items of additional information
expressed by means of belief functions Belit1 , . . . , Belitk compatible with a true
probability P . Let C be an acceptable combination function.
Then, the combination of belief functions Belit1 . . . Belitr for r < k using C
′
as in Definition 28 is a belief function Belr compatible with the true probability
P , and such that N(Belr) ≥ N(Belr+1).
In addition, if, for a given r0 the belief function Belr0 is a probability, then
Belr0 = P and for all r ≥ r0 we have Belr0 = Belr.
The proof of this proposition is trivial taking into account that C is an
acceptable combination function and that N(Bel) = 0 when Bel is a probability
distribution.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have formalized re-identification algorithms in terms of belief
functions and probabilities. We have shown that belief functions and their pig-
nistic transformation permits us to express the uncertainty in re-identification
algorithms in a natural way.
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